Media Capture in Azerbaijan and 2023-2024 Trends

Media capture occurs when a state or its allies exert overwhelming control over the media landscape – through laws, ownership, and intimidation – to suppress independent voices. Azerbaijan offers a stark example of media capture, where the ruling regime has systematically tightened its grip on independent press and freedom of expression. In recent years, especially between 2023–2024, Azerbaijani authorities escalated their crackdown on journalists and outlets via new restrictive laws, arrests on spurious charges, and censorship measures. Local journalists and NGOs report an unprecedented assault on media freedom, painting a grim picture corroborated by international watchdogs. This report analyses the current state of media capture in Azerbaijan. It provides policy recommendations for European Union (EU) and Council of Europe (CoE) stakeholders, emphasising legal frameworks and international intervention mechanisms to support media freedom in Azerbaijan.

Legal framework and policy shifts

Azerbaijan’s government has entrenched media control through an array of laws and regulations that leave little room for independent journalism. A pivotal development was the adoption of a new Law on Media in late 2021, which came into force in 2022. This law, introduced a state-run Media Registry requiring all media outlets and journalists to register with the Media Development Agency in order to qualify for an official accreditation . The criteria to register are onerous – journalists must have a higher education degree, a formal employment contract, and no criminal record of grave crimes to name a few – effectively barring many freelance or critical reporters from doing their profession. In a country where much of independent and alternative media operates as unregistered entities – due to non-transparent and lengthy registration procedures which often result in a failure to register with relevant state authorities – obtaining a legal employment contract is virtually impossible. In addition, many of the independent media professionals have faced detentions, arrests or fines in the course of their careers, thus disqualifying them due to the lack of clean criminal record. In addition, the new law obligates online news outlets to publish at least 20 news articles daily for 20 days of each calendar month, be founded by Azerbaijani citizens residing in the country, and submit journalists’ personal details, including ID numbers to the registry. While authorities initially claimed registration was “voluntary,” the Agency’s director warned in early 2023 that outlets which fail to register by the April 2023 deadline would be “hunted down” and taken to court, potentially to terminate their activities. As such the ambiguity of the so-called “voluntary” registration procedure is nothing but a de facto mandatory system, aimed to marginalise those who refuse to register while rewarding pro-government and government affiliated media, with state advertising and subsidies. When the law was rolled out for the first time, independent Azerbaijani journalists protested, describing it as “prohibitions from top to bottom,” and making their jobs “impossible,” , as unregistered reporters are denied access to official information – even barred from open parliament sessions and dismissed by state agencies. The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe examined the media law and unequivocally criticised it as “overregulation in an already restrictive environment,” noting it focuses on restricting media activities rather than enabling the press’s public watchdog role. Despite domestic and international calls to repeal or amend the law, Azerbaijani authorities have pressed forward, tightening legal control over who is allowed to practice journalism.

Beyond the media-specific law, Azerbaijan has continued to leverage other restrictive laws against critical voices. Highly restrictive legislation on non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – requiring state approval of foreign funding and registration of groups – has been wielded against independent media and journalists as well. By denying independent NGOs (including press freedom organisations) legal registration, authorities push them into operating on the margins of the law, then prosecute individuals associated with them for illegal entrepreneurship or other trumped-up offences. This tactic blurs the line between silencing civil society and muzzling the media, as many journalists are also civic activists. In 2022, Azerbaijan additionally amended laws to criminalise the spread of “false information” online, and maintains criminal defamation statutes, giving the government an arsenal of legal tools to penalise critical reporting.

Shifts in media policy were evident in 2023–2024 as Baku expanded its crackdown to digital spaces and foreign media. During sensitive events, authorities did not hesitate to impose information blackouts. Amid a one-day military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023, the government blocked access to the social media platform TikTok starting September 19 until October 31, ostensibly for security reasons. Dozens of people who posted critical comments about the operation on social networks were later arrested, signalling a zero-tolerance approach to dissenting narratives about the military operation. During the 44-day Second Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020, Azerbaijani authorities restricted internet access across the country. Throughout the war, internet users reported difficulties accessing social media platforms and communication apps. Restrictions on access were not applied to the state institutions or officials who relied on social media platforms to share updates and relevant news.

In another bold move, in February 2025 (just after the period under review), the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry ordered the suspension of the BBC News Azerbaijani service forcing the BBC to close its Baku bureau after 30 years’ of presence in the country. Additionally, Azerbaijan revoked accreditation of Bloomberg, making it the fourth media outlet that had its correspondents’ accreditation cancelled, following Voice of America Azerbaijan Service, BBC Azerbaijan Service, and Sputnik. Authorities offered no clear explanation beyond a vague reference to “reciprocity,” but the outcome was undeniable – independent news outlets effectively shut down. By allowing only a single BBC journalist to remain in-country, Baku severely curtailed Azerbaijanis’ access to unbiased international reporting. Such actions underscore a policy shift toward isolating the local information space, purging even foreign press presence in order to cement the state’s narrative monopoly. President Ilham Aliyev has repeatedly rejected criticism of these policies, insisting that Azerbaijan “has a free press and a free internet”, despite evidence to the contrary. Overall, by 2024 Azerbaijan’s legal and policy environment had evolved to systematically obstruct independent journalism – combining registration controls, broad laws against critical speech, ad-hoc censorship, and expulsion of foreign media – exemplifying modern media capture in practice.

Crackdown on journalists and independent media outlets

The restrictive bills have been accompanied by an escalating campaign of arrests, intimidation, and outlet closures targeting remaining independent journalists. Over 2023 and into 2024, authorities carried out waves of politically motivated detentions on dubious charges, effectively decimating what was left of independent media in the country. Human Rights Watch observed that the government’s “vicious crackdown on critics and dissenting voices intensified over the last two years,” with journalists, human rights defenders, and civic activists routinely arrested on bogus criminal charges. The modus operandi has been to accuse outspoken media figures of ordinary crimes unrelated to journalism – a tactic to portray them as criminals rather than persecuted reporters. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), at least 20 journalists and media workers from Azerbaijan’s largest independent outlets were charged on serious offences in late 2023, amid a campaign that coincided with deteriorating Azerbaijan–West relations. By the end of 2024, Azerbaijan had become one of the world’s top 10 jailers of journalists, a stark rise for a country of its size. The CPJ annual prison census for 2024 confirmed an unprecedented number of Azerbaijani journalists behind bars – at least 20 journalists jailed as of December, up from practically none a few years prior. This represents an “unprecedented media crackdown” according to CPJ’s Europe program coordinator, who in early 2025 described a “grim intent by Azerbaijani authorities to silence” the country’s “small and embattled independent media community.”

Key cases and patterns illustrate how the crackdown unfolded. In November 2023, one of Azerbaijan’s few remaining independent news platforms – Abzas Media – was raided by police and effectively dismantled. Abzas Media’s office was searched and its director, Ulvi Hasanli, along with five of his colleagues, were arrested and remanded to pretrial detention. They were all charged with “smuggling” offences, specifically accused of illegally importing foreign currency, a charge widely seen as a pretext to punish them for receiving grants from Western donors. (Hasanli was among a handful of independent journalists who critisised the media registry law, and saw “no point” in trying to register Abzas Media under a law full of prohibitions.) At the time of writing, the six Abzas Media journalists remain jailed awaiting judgements, as their trials continue. This marked the first time in decades that an entire media outlet’s staff was prosecuted en masse under criminal law in Azerbaijan. Around the same time, authorities turned their sights on Kanal13, a popular independent YouTube-based news channel. Kanal13’s Baku bureau chief, Aziz Orujov, was arrested on November 27, 2023, initially accused of unauthorised construction, but soon hit with additional smuggling charges (mirroring the Abzas case) before being sent to pretrial custody. Two other journalists from Kanal13 faced repercussions: one was detained for three months on smuggling charges, and another sentenced to 30 days’ administrative arrest for “hooliganism”. Authorities even moved to block access to Kanal13’s online content, with the Interior Ministry petitioning the courts to shut down its website for allegedly failing to register with the media registry and for sharing “discrediting” information. These coordinated actions in November 2023 effectively neutralised a prominent independent outlet— Abzas Media.

In March, 2024, police raided the Baku office of Toplum TV, a local online news channel, detaining staff, confiscating equipment, and sealing the premises. In a sinister parallel to the physical raid, Toplum TV’s YouTube and Instagram accounts were hacked and years’ worth of its content was wiped, effectively erasing the outlet’s digital presence. Following this, journalists from Toplum TV and its partner organisation, the Institute for Democratic Initiatives, were arrested. Seven of the arrested were placed under preliminary detention for 4 months, including Toplum TV co-founder and media lawyer Alasgar Mammadli and journalist Mushvig Jabbarov. Both were sent into jail on pretrial arrest on “smuggling” charges, while two other Toplum TV journalists were placed under house arrest on similar charges. In January 2025, one of the journalists under house arrest, Farid Ismayilov was arrested and sent into two months and twenty days pretrial detention.

The crackdown accelerated further into December 2024 and early 2025. On December 6, 2024, security forces detained at least seven journalists and media workers affiliated with Meydan TV – a well-known independent media organisation that operates largely from exile. Among those arrested were Meydan’s editor-in-chief and several reporters; all were likewise accused of “smuggling foreign currency” in connection with grants or funding from abroad. They were each ordered to four months of pretrial detention.

Observers note that these charges against Abzas, Kanal13, Meydan TV, and Toplum TV all follow a pattern – using financial or contraband allegations to clamp down on critical media – and that this pattern “picked up speed since November 2023.”

The Free Voices Collective, an Azerbaijani rights group in exile, reported that over 20 journalists and media workers (spanning Abzas, Toplum, Meydan, and others) have been arrested since late 2023 as part of this broader campaign to silence independent media.

In many of these cases, there are credible reports of due process violations and mistreatment. Detainees have been denied or delayed access to lawyers, and some journalists reported being subjected to physical and psychological pressure in custody. One journalist’s lawyer recounted how her client was pinned to a wall and beaten during a house search. Others emerged from detention with bruises on their faces, alleging they were coerced to give false statements under duress. These abuses reinforce the climate of fear for anyone doing independent reporting. By early 2024, Azerbaijan’s small pool of remaining independent journalists was either behind bars, forced into hiding, or working under extreme duress. The U.S. State Department, the EU, and international rights organizations have condemned this onslaught. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in December 2024 publicly urged Azerbaijan to release the jailed journalists, calling the prosecutions a blatant human rights violation. A statement by media freedom NGOs described the arrests as part of a “broader effort to silence dissent in Azerbaijan.”

Domestically, however, the government’s position remains defiant – officials insist that if there is “evidence” of crimes, journalists are not above the law. This narrative tries to legitimise the crackdown, even as the sheer scope and pattern of the arrests strongly indicate political motives.

Impact on the media environment

As a result of these measures, Azerbaijan’s media environment between 2023–24 has been described as one of the most repressive in the world. Most Azerbaijanis today receive news only from pro-government sources, or government aligned media especially television, which is tightly controlled by the state. Independent print media has nearly vanished, and critical websites are frequently blocked or rendered inaccessible domestically. The latter has been in place at least since 2017. Self-censorship is widespread among journalists who remain in the country – many “try to stay invisible,” in the words of one report, avoiding topics that could anger authorities. The few independent journalists who operated without registration found themselves blocked from official events and denied information, making it nearly impossible to report on public affairs. The government has even dictated news coverage in mainstream outlets through daily “topic lists” sent in WhatsApp groups, ensuring that state-aligned media only report stories favourable to the regime. Meanwhile, pro-government trolls and smear campaigns aggressively attack those journalists and outlets that still publish fact-based content. In 2023, government-backed troll farms systematically labeled independent reporters as lacking patriotism or being “anti-Azerbaijani” and accused them of serving Western agendas. Officials and state media amplifying this rhetoric have painted unregistered journalists as foreign agents or even traitors – for example, a pro-government site absurdly claimed that journalists opposing the media registry were working for Iran or other outside “secret hands” to destabilise the country. Such propaganda further poisons the public perception of independent press.

International indices reflect this steep decline. Reporters Without Borders in its 2024 World Press Freedom Index ranked Azerbaijan 164th of 180 countries, noting the “authorities’ crackdown on the media” and rapid deterioration in conditions. (Azerbaijan dropped 13 places from the previous year’s ranking.) Freedom House continues to rate Azerbaijan “Not Free,” on freedom of expression ranking the country at the bottom of its index. These assessments align with local human rights groups’ findings: by late 2024, Azerbaijan had over 300 individuals designated as political prisoners, an all-time high, many of them journalists or activists jailed for speech-related offences. In sum, the period between 2023–2024 saw Azerbaijan’s independent media all but captured or crushed by the state. What remains is a media space dominated by the ruling Aliyev regime’s narrative, with critical voices silenced through a combination of legal barriers, economic pressure, and sheer force. The testimonies of Azerbaijani journalists highlight this reality – “I can’t do my job… we have to censor ourselves or risk prison,” one journalist said, capturing the difficulties of reporters in today’s Azerbaijan.

Policy recommendations for protecting media freedom in Azerbaijan

The alarming state of media freedom in Azerbaijan calls for urgent attention and action from international stakeholders, particularly the European Union (EU) and the Council of Europe (CoE), of which Azerbaijan is a member. The following policy recommendations focus on leveraging legal frameworks and diplomatic tools to support independent media and hold the Azerbaijani government to account:

The EU and CoE should pressure Azerbaijan to fundamentally amend the 2022 Media Law and related regulations that enforce media registration and accreditation. The Council of Europe’s Venice Commission has already called for abolishing the law due to its focus on restriction over facilitation of journalism. The CoE Committee of Ministers – which supervises the implementation of European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) judgments – should tie Azerbaijan’s compliance with relevant ECtHR rulings to reforms in media legislation. Azerbaijan has lost multiple ECtHR cases on freedom of expression and media (involving jailed journalists and blocked websites); the Committee of Ministers should use these to demand legislative change, invoking infringement proceedings if Baku persistently fails to comply. Concretely, mandatory journalist registration should be scrapped or made truly voluntary, criminal defamation should be decriminalised, and any laws criminalising “false information” or similar should be brought in line with European free speech standards. EU institutions, in dialogues with Azerbaijan (for example, under the EU-Azerbaijan Cooperation Agreement or the Eastern Partnership framework), should make clear that progress on media freedom laws is a condition for deeper cooperation.
The EU should not overlook human rights in favour of realpolitik interests such as energy. The European Parliament went so far as to urge suspension of the EU-Azerbaijan 2022 Memorandum on a Strategic Energy Partnership if repression continues. European governments and the European Commission should review this partnership – Azerbaijan’s lucrative gas exports to Europe – and inject strict human rights conditions into its implementation. At minimum, a human rights monitoring mechanism could be attached, and increases in energy cooperation should be made contingent on measurable improvements in media freedom (e.g. release of jailed journalists, reversal of oppressive laws). Additionally, within trade and investment discussions, the EU should use its influence to encourage Azerbaijan to honour its CoE obligations on freedom of expression. This conditionality aligns with the EU’s broader principle (enshrined in Article 21 TEU) of promoting human rights in external relations.
Both European and international actors should strengthen the capacity of independent Azerbaijani media-in-exile and digital media to continue their work. Many Azerbaijani journalists have fled to EU countries or neighbouring states; the EU and member states should provide funding (via the European Endowment for Democracy, for example) to these exiled outlets, ensuring they can produce content and reach audiences back home via the internet. EU member states should expedite asylum or emergency visa processes for journalists at imminent risk in Azerbaijan, creating a safe pathway for those who need to escape persecution. By sheltering threatened journalists and enabling them to keep reporting from abroad, the international community can help keep independent news alive for Azerbaijani audiences, undermining the regime’s information monopoly.
International oversight bodies should keep Azerbaijan’s press freedom on the agenda. The Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) should continue its scrutiny – for instance, through periodic reports on political prisoners in Azerbaijan (which include journalists) and urgent debates or resolutions condemning new arrests. PACE and the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights should engage directly with Azerbaijani authorities and offer expertise to reform media laws in line with CoE standards. The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media should intensify attention on Azerbaijan, issuing public statements and requesting official visits to assess the situation. At the United Nations, like-minded states should use forums such as the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) – Azerbaijan is due for regular review – to raise press freedom concerns and give recommendations (e.g. release jailed journalists, allow independent outlets to operate). International human rights NGOs and Azerbaijani exiled groups, like the Free Voices Collective, should continue to document abuses and submit evidence to these bodies; for example, NGOs can make Rule 9.2 submissions to the CoE about Azerbaijan’s non-compliance with ECtHR judgments on freedom of expression.

Consistency and resolve is the key in implementing these recommendations. Azerbaijan’s government often responds to international criticism with denial or by touting token measures (for instance, occasionally releasing one or two political prisoners to placate critics). The EU and CoE should therefore set clear benchmarks – e.g., release of all journalists imprisoned on spurious charges, removal of legal barriers to independent media, and an end to harassment of journalists’ families – and tie their actions to those benchmarks.

Media capture in Azerbaijan is nearly complete – independent journalism has been pushed to the limits by repressive laws, arrests, and intimidation. The developments between 2023 and 2025 show the government’s determination to eliminate dissenting voices at all costs, even as courageous journalists and civil society members continue to resist. The patterns seen in Azerbaijan mirror a broader trend of authoritarian media suppression seen in countries like Russia and Turkey, though Azerbaijan’s small size and swift crackdowns have made its situation acutely more alarming. Europe’s institutions and democracies worldwide must not treat Azerbaijan’s human rights situation with indifference or exceptionalism because of energy or geopolitics. Instead, they should apply the lessons learned from other backsliding states: early, sustained, and coordinated pressure can fight back the worst abuses, while study support to independent voices can keep hope alive.