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Meeting: 1521st meeting (March 2025) (DH)

Communication from NGOs (Free Voices Collective and the Independent Lawyers Network) (14/01/2025) in the Khadija Ismayilova group of cases v. Azerbaijan (Application No. 65286/13).

Information made available under Rule 9.2 of the Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of the execution of judgments and of the terms of friendly settlements.

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Réunion : 1521^e réunion (mars 2025) (DH)

Communication d'ONG (Free Voices Collective et the Independent Lawyers Network) (14/01/2025) dans le groupe d'affaires Khadija Ismayilova c. Azerbaïdjan (requête n° 65286/13) **[anglais uniquement]**

Informations mises à disposition en vertu de la Règle 9.2 des Règles du Comité des Ministres pour la surveillance de l'exécution des arrêts et des termes des règlements amiables.




DGI Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law

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14 January 2025

COMMUNICATION

In accordance with Rule 9.2. of the rules of the Committee of Ministers regarding the supervision of the execution of judgments in the Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan group of cases (65286/13, 57270/14, 35283/14)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. This submission is made by **Free Voices Collective (FVC) and the Independent Lawyers Network (ILN)** to the Committee of Ministers (CM or Committee) of the Council of Europe (CoE) in respect of the Khadija Ismayilova Group of Cases v. Azerbaijan, (Application nos.: 65286/13 and 57270/14, 35283/14) in accordance with Rule 9.2 of the Rules of the CM for the supervision of the execution of judgments.
2. This submission is provided in order to inform the Committee about recent developments on the failure of implementation of the aforementioned judgments in the Khadija Ismayilova Group of Cases by the Azerbaijani Government and the systematic worsening of human rights situation in Azerbaijan prior to the Committee's next DH meeting in March 2025.

Communicating organizations - FVC and ILN

3. The signatory organizations, FVC and ILN are non-governmental human rights organizations working to advance respect for human rights.

4. Free Voices Collective is an EU-based non-profit, and non-governmental organization established by South Caucasus human rights defenders, journalists, and lawyers in exile. The FVC's mission is to build a democratic environment in South Caucasus by advocating for the rights and protections of journalists, activists, and NGOs, ensuring a society where civil freedoms are upheld and civil society can thrive without fear of persecution.
5. The Independent Lawyers Network is an Azerbaijan-based non-profit and non-governmental organization, which is committed to strengthen the role of the lawyers to protect human rights and freedoms effectively through strategic litigations and advocacy.

Brief summary of the cases

6. The facts in the cases of *Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan* (65286/13 and 57270/14) and *Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (No.3)*¹ (35283/14) concern Ms Khadija Ismayilova, an investigative journalist who, as a result of her work, received a threatening letter, had an intimate video secretly filmed in her bedroom and published on the internet, followed by newspaper articles critical of her morality. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or Court) found violations of Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR or Convention) stemming from the authorities' failure to protect her rights to respect for her private life and freedom of expression by, inter alia, failing to carry out an effective criminal investigation into these events.

II. INDIVIDUAL MEASURES

Restitutio in integrum

7. The upcoming hearing is going to be the sixth hearing on the status of implementation of the *Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan* (65286/13 and 57270/14) and *Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (No.3)* (35283/14) cases since 2020. With due respect, we inform the Committee that the Government of Azerbaijan failed to provide adequate individual measures in the current cases and restitutio in integrum, or full restoration to the original condition, should be ensured to the possible extent.
8. The last hearing of the *Khadija Ismayilova Group* case was held during the 1501st meeting of the Committee on 11-13 June 2024. According to the Committee's decision, the Government failed to provide adequate information regarding on the following measures: 1) personal information remains publicly accessible; 2) the proper investigation on the matters indicated in the Court's decision has not been conducted; 3) personal and general hindrances to journalistic activity have not been addressed; 4) civil proceedings concerning the case have not been reopened in the domestic courts.²

¹ A third judgment, *Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan* (no. 2), No. 30778/15, concerning unfounded and politically motivated criminal proceedings brought against the applicant is examined by the Committee within the Mammadli group, available at <https://hudoc.exec.coe.int/eng?i=004-50875>

² Committee of the Ministers, 1501st meeting, 11-13 June 2024 (DH), CM/Del/Dec(2024)1501/H46-3 available at [https://hudoc.exec.coe.int/eng?i=CM/Del/Dec\(2024\)1501/H46-03E](https://hudoc.exec.coe.int/eng?i=CM/Del/Dec(2024)1501/H46-03E)

9. With regard to the first measure, the personal data of the applicant remains online in violation of the Court's decision. Contrary to government assertions³, Ms. Ismayilova's private details, remain publicly accessible⁴, including in state media⁵. Particularly, her sensitive information under App. no 65286/13, depicted as immoral and corrupt, was published in the state-run 'Yeni Azerbaijan' and the government-controlled 'Ses' on March 13 and March 16, 2012, respectively. The articles, titled "Khadija Ismayilova as she seems and as she is"⁶ in 'Yeni Azerbaijan' and "Not surprising"⁷ in 'Ses' are still online. Finally, the article which is the subject of the App. no. 35283/14 also remains accessible.⁸
10. With regard to the second measure, the Government fails to showcase the adequate steps they took to thoroughly investigate the application. In the decision, the Court found that investigation qualifies as *effective* if it can potentially establish case facts and identify and sanction those responsible, although it's not guaranteed to produce results but should aim to do so. The Court uses the *significant flaw* test to evaluate the effectiveness of criminal investigations, particularly under Article 8 of the Convention in similar cases, meaning that minor errors or isolated omissions don't fall under the Court's scrutiny, which focuses instead on substantial procedural shortcomings that could impede fulfilling the State's investigative obligations.⁹
11. The Court further identified that the current case shares the element of targeting a journalist critical of the government, suggesting that the threats she received were linked to her journalistic work. The complex operations against the applicant seemed well-coordinated, involving multiple individuals and steps, suggesting a need for a detailed investigation. However, evidence suggests significant delays and a lack of adequate follow-up on key leads, such as the origins of a threatening letter sent from Moscow and the identities involved in setting up surveillance in her flat. Despite some investigative steps, like interviewing witnesses and ordering expert examinations, the government's submissions lack comprehensive documentation of these actions, weakening the Court's ability to evaluate the investigation's depth and breadth.
12. Within the five years since the issue of the Court's judgment, the Government have submitted two Action Reports¹⁰ and in both failed to address the concerns raised by the Court regarding the investigation. Notably, the government failed to show its efforts in investigation concerning the

³ Government of Azerbaijan, Communication from the authorities concerning the case of Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (26 June 2023), para 4, available at [https://hudoc.exec.coe.int/ENG?i=DH-DD\(2023\)766E](https://hudoc.exec.coe.int/ENG?i=DH-DD(2023)766E)

⁴ See: <https://qafqazinfo.az/news/detail/bxedice-ismayilovanin-cinayet-isinde-sok-adlarb-16639>

⁵ See: https://azertag.az/xeber/Jurnalistin_sexsi_erizesi_esasinda_baslanmis_cinayet_isinin_istintaqi_tam_obyektiv_aparilir-170033

⁶ https://yeniazerbaycan.com/Siyaset_e9392_az.html

⁷ <https://sesqazeti.az/news/articles/220116.html>

⁸ <https://sesqazeti.az/news/articles/319937.html>

⁹ Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan, App. no 65286/13, 10.04.2019, para. 118, available at

<https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#%7B%22itemid%22:%5B%22001-188993%22%5D%7D>

¹⁰ See: 1501st meeting (June 2024) (DH) - Action Report (04/04/2024) - Communication from Azerbaijan concerning the case of Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (Application No. 65286/13) available at [https://hudoc.exec.coe.int/eng#%7B%22display%22:%5B%22DH-DD\(2024\)386E%22%5D%7D](https://hudoc.exec.coe.int/eng#%7B%22display%22:%5B%22DH-DD(2024)386E%22%5D%7D) and 1451st meeting (December 2022) (DH) - Action report (17/10/2022) - Communication from Azerbaijan concerning the case of Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (Application No. 65286/13) available at [https://hudoc.exec.coe.int/eng#%7B%22display%22:%5B%22DH-DD\(2022\)1108E%22%5D%7D](https://hudoc.exec.coe.int/eng#%7B%22display%22:%5B%22DH-DD(2022)1108E%22%5D%7D)

threatening letter and illicit recording and sharing of intimate videos. There is also no evidence of proper interrogation of a key witness and insufficient efforts to identify the sender of the threatening letter, the operators of the websites where the videos were uploaded, or those who uploaded the videos. Moreover, there was no exploration into whether these violations were related to applicant's journalistic work, despite the court's view of this as a crucial line of inquiry.

13. The latest government report on April 4, 2024, to the Committee showed no significant investigative progress since previous reports, with only a follow-up letter to U.S. authorities and vague mentions of new allegations by Ms. Ismayilova in 2022. Notably, since 2022, Ms. Ismayilova has not been updated on the investigation's progress or its details, even though she provided useful information from her own legal actions in the U.S. in 2012.¹¹
14. The government also failed to provide a safe environment for the applicant where she can practice her journalistic activity without a hindrance. While, this is closely connected to the general measures, which we cover more thoroughly in the following sections, specifically in this case, the applicant continues to be harassed by the authorities due to her journalism. This is also separately mentioned as an individual measure in the Committee's latest decision.¹² For example, on March 6, 2024, police raided Toplum TV, where she is the editor-in-chief. Authorities arrested seven staff members, including the founder, of this independent news outlet and sealed its offices. This independent news outlet saw seven of its staff, including its founder, arrested, and its offices sealed. Ms. Ismayilova was interrogated in connection with her colleagues' arrest, and a new travel ban was issued, its specifics unclear due to the authorities' lack of transparency. Furthermore, Toplum TV's YouTube channel was disabled following a hacking incident that altered its name and erased its content. Currently, Toplum TV is shut down, effectively barring Ms. Ismayilova from practicing journalism.¹³

III. GENERAL MEASURES

Failed investigation: Prosecutorial dependence on executive authority and weak judicial oversight

15. The Office of the Prosecutor in Azerbaijan exhibits dependence on the Executive Branch, specifically the President and the Presidential Administration, thereby compromising the independence of its investigatory functions. Notwithstanding this dependence, the Constitution of Azerbaijan nominally situates the Prosecutor's Office within the judicial branch.¹⁴ However, the

¹¹ Submission by Media Defence pursuant to Rule 9.2 of the Committee of Ministers' Rules on the Khadija Ismayilova Group of Cases v. Azerbaijan (Applications nos. 65286/13, 57270/14 and 35283/14) and on the Mammadli Group of Cases v. Azerbaijan (Application no. 30778/15) 02 May 2024 available at [https://hudoc.exec.coe.int/eng?i=DH-DD\(2022\)613E](https://hudoc.exec.coe.int/eng?i=DH-DD(2022)613E)

¹² *ibid* (no 2)

¹³ Statement by Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović On the Intimidation and Harassment Of Journalists And Civil Society Activists available at <https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/azerbaijan-should-end-the-intimidation-and-harassment-of-journalists-and-civil-society-activists> See also: <https://cpj.org/2024/03/azerbaijani-police-raid-toplum-tv-detain-journalists-over-alleged-currency-smuggling/>; <https://rsf.org/en/toplum-tv-latest-victim-azerbaijan-s-persecution-journalists>; <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/03/azerbaijan-campaign-of-intimidation-against-independent-media-continues-with-raid-on-toplum-tv/>

¹⁴ Constitution of Azerbaijan, Chapter VII. Judicial Power, Art. 133, available at <https://president.az/en/pages/view/azerbaijan/constitution>

Office of the Prosecutor is de-facto a part of the Executive Branch. According to the Constitution, the President appoints and dismisses the Prosecutor General and other prosecutors. The grounds for dismissal of the Prosecutor General are vague, putting the whole institution in direct dependency of the President.¹⁵ The Prosecutor is accountable to the President and Parliament, with vague accountability grounds, and no public criteria on reporting grounds to the President.¹⁶ One of the main GRECO recommendations to Azerbaijani Government under the last publicly available review was to ensure “the Prosecutor’s Office Act be reviewed so as to eliminate any undue influence and interference in the investigation of criminal cases in the exercise of statutory controls over the activities of the Prosecutor’s Office”.¹⁷ Such legal environment creates a tangible dependency and hierarchical relations between Prosecutor’s Office and the President, creating serious grounds for doubting the independence of the Prosecution Office. The obvious example is the *Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan* group cases where investigation failed to provide a thorough investigation of the criminal acts committed against the defendant. The Government’s explanation that they tried but have not succeeded in the process of finding the perpetrators lacks credibility, as the same government is regularly sharing the news of successful operations on catching the criminals and criminal bands involved in online crimes.¹⁸

16. The limited supervisory capabilities of judges over investigations create an imbalance of powers among the branches of government, rendering the judiciary relatively ineffective compared to a more dominant prosecution. Although the Prosecutor's Office is formally part of the Judicial Power, judges possess restricted authority to oversee investigative proceedings, as delineated in the Criminal Procedural Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan, specifically in the Judicial Supervision Section, Articles 442-454, and particularly Article 449. Article 449 specifies only a few circumstances under which the judiciary may review the investigation process. Moreover, the provisions for judicial action on investigative inaction are ambiguously defined. Judicial practice often shows reluctance to entertain complaints from the defense not explicitly covered by Article 449. In cases with politically motivated charges, this supervisory mechanism proves particularly ineffective. An illustrative case is the currently reviewed *Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan* (65286/13 and 57270/14) case, where the applicant's request for judicial oversight of the investigation was denied on the grounds that the issues raised were not specified in the Criminal Procedural Code.¹⁹

¹⁵The Functioning of the Judicial System in Azerbaijan and its Impact on the Right to a Fair Trial of Human Rights Defenders, available at <https://www.nhc.nl/assets/uploads/2017/07/Functioning-of-the-Judicial-System-in-Azerbaijan-and-its-Impact-on-the-Right-to-a-Fair-Trial.pdf>

¹⁶ *ibid* (no 15)

¹⁷ Corruption prevention in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors. Fourth Evaluation Round, Azerbaijan, 2020 available at <https://rm.coe.int/fourth-evaluation-round-corruption-prevention-in-respect-of-members-of/1680a28742>

¹⁸ See: <https://www.bakupost.az/kibercinayetkar-ispaniyada-saxlanildj>; <https://modern.az/news/354351/>; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qDkXguwHcWM>; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N7Od-i3OODY>

¹⁹ *ibid*. (no 9) , para.151

Restricted environment for journalistic activity: Media law and ongoing crackdown on journalists and wider civil society

17. On 30 December 2021, the Parliament of Azerbaijan adopted the infamous Media Law, which introduced “overregulation in already restricted environment”.²⁰ On 20 June 2022, the Venice Commission, published a detailed analysis of the Media Law and restrictions and hindrances it creates for the journalist. There is no need to present in detail the analysis of the Media Law before the Committee in this paper, all necessary information can be found in Venice Commission’s opinion²¹, however, to highlight a few of them which are relevant to our case is necessary.
18. The underlying rationale for the Law from the Government’s side is to create a favorable environment for journalistic activity. However, there are numerous examples when threats to journalists because of their activities, violation of their private life, blackmailing issues were not addressed by the government, similarly to the current case.
19. For example, over the last five years, there have been more than 200 recorded incidents where journalists in Azerbaijan were hindered from performing their duties, yet Article 163 of the Azerbaijani Criminal Code, which penalizes the obstruction of journalists’ legal professional activities, has not been enforced in any of these cases. For example, despite the attack at knifepoint and threats against the journalist Aytan Mammadova and her young daughter, which were likely related to her work covering a criminal trial in which she has reported on evidence of alleged police malpractice, the authorities only initiated an investigation under Article 134 (threat of murder or grave harm) instead of applying Article 163.²²
20. Further, Azerbaijani authorities have consistently failed to uphold journalists’ right to private life, guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, nor have they effectively investigated breaches of these rights. For example, in early 2023, the private emails of journalist Aytaj Akhmedova were leaked without her permission in an attempt to discredit her. Akhmedova, who works for the critical media outlet Meydan TV - forced to cease operations in Azerbaijan due to legal pressures — filed a complaint with local authorities. However, her request for an investigation and criminal charges against those responsible went unaddressed.²³
21. The new wave has particularly escalated since November 2023, when the pro-government media outlets in Azerbaijan have noticeably intensified its slander campaign against civil society and media entities, with the accusations against them of collaborating with Western organizations and

²⁰ Council of Europe. Azerbaijan: Media Law - Overregulation in an Already Restrictive Environment, 2022, available at <https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/azerbaijan-media-law-overregulation-in-an-already-restrictive-environment>

²¹ Venice Commission. 'Opinion on On the Law On Media in Azerbaijan.' Council of Europe, Opinion No. 1078/2022, 2022, available at [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2022\)009-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2022)009-e)

²² *ibid* (no 11)

²³ *ibid* (no 11)

receiving funds from them that they allegedly illegally bring to Azerbaijan.²⁴ This was soon followed by a series of legal repercussions for those targeted, including arrests, interrogations, blocking of bank accounts, and travel bans. It escalated with the arrests of members of independent media outlet AbzasMedia when the police arrested six journalists from the entire managerial and editorial team of AbzasMedia under smuggling charges, followed by other arrests in 2023 and early 2024:

- On 20-21 November 2023, Abzas Media director Ulvi Hasanli and his assistant Mahammad Kekalov (disability rights activist) and chief editor Sevinj Vagifgyzy were detained by Baku city main police department; a week later, on November 30, journalist Nargiz Absalamova was summoned as a witness but was detained as a suspect. They were all charged under Article 206.3.2 (smuggling when committed by a group of persons) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan.²⁵
- On 27 November 2023, Kanal 13 journalists Aziz Orujov and Shamo Eminov were arrested under the same charges.²⁶
- On 11 December 2023, Azerbaijani journalist, Teymur Karimov, was arrested on charges of extortion by threat (Article 182 of the Criminal Code).²⁷
- On 13 December 2023, investigative journalist Hafiz Babaly was detained on charges of smuggling when committed by a group of persons (article 206.3.2 of the Criminal Code) as a part of the same criminal investigation against AbzasMedia.
- On 14 December 2023, police arrested Tofiq Yagublu, a former journalist who is an outspoken critic of the government and a prominent opposition leader.²⁸ Yagublu was charged under Articles 178.3.2 (fraud by an organized group), 320.1 (Forgery of official documents), and 320.2 (Use of counterfeit documents) of the Criminal Code of Azerbaijan.²⁹
- On 13 January 2024, after her questioning at the Baku City Main Police Department, journalist Elnara Gasimova was detained as a suspect and accused on charges of smuggling committed by a

²⁴ March 8, 2024 - "Toplum TV" adapts its activities not to the laws of Azerbaijan, but to the directives from the United States. https://musavat.com/news/toplum-tv-oz-fealiyyetini-azerbaycan-naunlarina-deil-abs-dan-gelen-direktivlere-ugunlasdirir_1051312.html; March 8, 2024: Where does Toplum TV's funding come from? <https://qafqazinfo.az/news/detail/toplum-tvniin-maliyye-menbevi-haradan-gaynaglanir-429575> ; March 9, 2024: More than half a million funds were illegally delivered to Azerbaijan via Toplum TV. <https://qafqazinfo.az/news/detail/toplum-tv-uzerinden-yarim-milyondan-cox-vesait-geyri-ganuni-azerbaycana-catdirilib-429641>; 30 January 2024: Authorities continue searching for "spies" and "traitors" among civil society, <https://turan.az/en/politics/authorities-continue-searching-for-spies-and-traitors-among-civil-society>; November 22, 2023: How are unregistered grants from the West implemented in Azerbaijan? - RESEARCH, <https://report.az/analitika/qerbden-gelen-qeydiyyatsiz-grantlar-azerbaycanda-nece-realize-edilir-arasdirma/> ; November 21, 2023: US Updates Subversive Technologies, Builds Compact, Agile Squads - INVESTIGATION <https://report.az/analitika/abs-texribat-texnologiyalarini-yenileyir-yigcam-cevik-desteler-formalasdirilir/> ; November 23, 2023: Treacherous plans of US institutions... This time NGOs and mass media were "controlled" by feminists... https://www.yeniazərbaycan.com/Siyaset_e93500_az.html;

²⁵ Frontline defenders, "Nargiz Absalamova, Hafiz Babali, and Elnara Gasimova of Abzas Media detained on money smuggling charges", March 7, 2024: <https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/case/nargiz-absalamova-hafiz-babali-and-elnara-gasimova-abzas-media-detained-money-smuggling-charges>

²⁶ Committee to Protect Journalists: Azerbaijani authorities charge Kanal 13 journalists Aziz Orujov and Shamo Eminov over alleged foreign donor money, order channel blocked, January 8, 2024, <https://cpi.org/2024/01/azerbaijani-authorities-charge-kanal-13-journalists-aziz-orujov-and-shamo-eminov-over-alleged-foreign-donor-money-order-channel-blocked/>

²⁷ Amnesty International: "Azerbaijan: Authorities intensifying crackdown on independent media", December 12, 2023, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/12/azerbaijan-authorities-intensifying-crackdown-on-independent-media/>

²⁸ Human Rights Watch, Azerbaijan: Prominent Opposition Figure Arrested, Tofiq Yagublu Is Latest Government Critic Targeted, December 19, 2023, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/12/19/azerbaijan-prominent-opposition-figure-arrested>

²⁹ JAMnews: "Prominent Azerbaijani opposition figure remains under arrest", 16.04.2024, <https://jam-news.net/azerbaijani-oppositionist-remains-under-arrest/>

group of persons by prior conspiracy (Art. 206.3.2 of the Criminal Code). Gasimova became the sixth journalist and media worker arrested in the Abzas Media case.

- Eight representatives of the three entities, the Institute for Democratic Initiatives, Toplum TV and the Third Republic Platform, have been arrested following the raid. Between 6-8 March 2024, the Baku District Court ordered a four-month pre-trial detention for several journalists and human rights defenders, including Akif Gurbanov (co-founder of IDI and III Republic Platforms), Ali Zeynalov, Mushvig Jabbar, Ramil Babayev, Ilkin Amhrahov, and Alasgar Memmedli (all from Toplum TV), as well as Ruslan Izzatli (co-founder of III Republic Platform). Additionally, the prosecuting authority decided to impose police supervision on Elmir Abbasov and Farid Ismayilov both journalists from Toplum TV.³⁰
- On 22 April 2024, Imran Aliyev, the head of the Meclis.info portal that monitors the parliamentary activities, was arrested.³¹
- On 6 December 2024, the Baku City Main Police Department carried out its next operation this time against Meydan TV – a media outlet that works closely with many independent journalists from Azerbaijan, who have been forced into exile, and consistently provides independent coverage of social and political events within the country. According to reports, on 6 December 2024, police detained 5 journalists affiliated with Meydan TV and one independent journalist. Nevertheless, initial reports indicated a total of 13 individuals were reported as suspects, following court decisions on 8 December only seven journalists are arrested in relation to criminal case on Meydan TV.³²

22. This list is not exhaustive and includes attacks only on journalists and media representatives. The scope of this crackdown is the largest since Azerbaijan entered the CoE. Currently, more than 300 people are arrested under bogus charges for their journalistic or other civil society affiliation.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

23. In light of the above, the signatory organizations call on the Committee to urge the Government to take the following steps to fully implement the ECtHR's judgments in this Group:

Regarding Individual Measures

1. Conduct the investigation into Ms. Ismayilova's private life disturbances in line with international human rights norms and the Court's decisions in the cases of Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan.
2. Ensure the removal of all defamatory and private content related to Ms. Ismayilova from the internet that was disclosed in her legal cases.
3. Remove obstacles to Ms. Ismayilova's professional activities, including lifting any travel bans and ensuring she can continue her journalism without interference.

³⁰ The news agency Turan: "The detention of three more arrested "in the case of Toplum TV" has been extended", 3 July 2024, <https://turan.az/en/politics/the-detention-of-three-more-arrested-in-the-case-of-toplum-tv-has-been-extended>

³¹ Committee to Protect Journalists, Azerbaijan arrests 13th journalist over alleged international donor funding, April 22, 2024, <https://cpj.org/2024/04/azerbaijan-arrests-13th-journalist-over-alleged-international-donor-funding/>

³² Azerbaijani independent journalists accused of "smuggling", Meydan TV, 2024 available at <https://www.meydan.tv/en/article/azerbaijani-independent-journalists-accused-of-smuggling/>

Regarding General Measures

4. Completely abolish the Media Law and Media Development Agency, which creates hindrances and overregulation in an already restricted political environment.
5. Put an immediate end to the ongoing wave of retaliatory prosecution and release all those detained under politically motivated charges.

On behalf of the signatory organizations,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'N. Mammadbayli', with a horizontal line underneath the signature.

Nijat Mammadbayli

Co-founder

Free Voices Collective